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PERMITTING EFFICIENCY IN STORM 
WATER EFFLUENT COMPLIANCE 
RYELLE SEYMOUR* 
Abstract: In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. County of Los Ange-
les, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit violations 
under the Clean Water Act. Environmental organizations brought suit against 
the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Flood Control District 
after the District published monitoring station reports identifying 140 separate 
exceedances of permit limitations. Even though the defendants’ monitoring 
station was located downstream from other permittees, the defendants were 
held liable as a matter of law for the violations because the permit clearly stat-
ed that the monitoring station data would be used to determine permittee 
compliance. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was cor-
rect, and further that preliminary testing for the monitoring station as well as 
more frequent monitoring and reporting will clarify liability. 
INTRODUCTION 
Clean water is essential; without it, the processes and functioning of 
Earth’s ecosystems would be futile.1 All of life depends on water to 
transport food and nutrients, dilute and remove waste, cool organisms and 
the land, and generally maintain a climate that sustains life.2 In the United 
States, more than 250 million people depend on fresh water for their drink-
ing water.3 
“Dirty water is the world’s biggest health risk,” threatening human 
health and lives across the United States.4 For instance, when aquatic ani-
mals consume dirty water, the toxins are then passed up the food chain and 
subsequently ingested by humans, posing a number of health risks including 
immune suppression, reproductive failure, or acute poisoning.5 One of the 
most substantial sources of water pollution in the United States comes from 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2015–2016. 
 1 See Surface and Groundwater, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://epa.sownar.com/agriculture/
tsur.html#content [http://perma.cc/XMM7-JPYN]. 
 2 See id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Water, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/water/ [http://perma.cc/5JWN-QUQA]. 
 5 See Danger, Health, WATER POLLUTION GUIDE, http://www.water-pollution.org.uk/health.
html [http://perma.cc/D7XV-BHZ6]. 
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storm water runoff.6 Storm water runoff is generated when precipitation 
such as rain and snow becomes polluted after landing on impervious surfac-
es such as streets, parking lots, and building roofs.7 This polluted water then 
makes its way into storm drains that eventually dump into waters of the 
United States, such as rivers and oceans.8 
In 1972, Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 
1948 by enacting the Clean Water Act (CWA) to “restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”9 The 
CWA prohibits discharging pollutants into the waters of the United States 
unless the discharge is permitted through an applicable section of the 
CWA.10 One of the CWA sections that authorizes discharge into waters of 
the United States is Section 402, which outlines the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit program.11 CWA authorizes 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish the NPDES permit 
program to govern point source discharges of pollutants into navigable wa-
ters by setting limits, monitoring, and reporting requirements for permitted 
entities.12 Pursuant to Section 402(p) of the CWA, EPA is required to issue 
NPDES permits for medium and large Municipal Separate Storm Sewer 
Systems (MS4s).13 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 7 See NPDES Stormwater Program, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/
npdes-stormwater-program [https://perma.cc/28N9-ECGE]. 
 8 See L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d at 1197. 
 9 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012); see History of the Clean Water Act, EN-
VTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/history-clean-water-act [http://perma.
cc/Q8WQ-SYVR]. 
 10 33 U.S.C. § 1311. 
 11 Id. §§ 1311, 1342. 
 12 See id. § 1342; Clean Water Act (CWA) and Federal Facilities, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/clean-water-act-cwa-and-federal-facilities 
[http://perma.cc/PW6U-LQF6]. “Point source” is defined as: 
[A]ny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to 
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling 
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from 
which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural 
storm-water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture. 
33 U.S.C. § 1362 (14) (2012). 
 13 Pacific Southwest, Region 9: NPDES Wastewater & Stormwater Permits, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/region9/water/npdes/stormwater.html [https://perma.cc/582C-H86V]. 
“MS4 refers to conveyance or system of conveyances (including roads with drainage systems, mu-
nicipal streets, catch basins, curbs, gutters, ditches, man-made channels, and storm drains) which is 
owned or operated by a state, city, town, county, district, association, or other public body (created by 
or pursuant to state law).” ARK. DEP’T ENVTL. QUALITY, WHAT IS AN MS4? 1, http://www2.
adeq.state.ar.us/water/branch_permits/general_permits/stormwater/pdfs/what_is_an_ms4_20120911.
pdf [https://perma.cc/SH4W-7CBR]. 
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The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors and the Los Angeles 
County Department of Public Works govern the Los Angeles County Flood 
Control District (the “District”).14 Each city in the District operates its own 
MS4, connecting to the District’s larger MS4, known as the LA MS4.15 The 
LA MS4 discharges untreated storm water into the Los Angeles and San 
Gabriel Rivers, which eventually flow into the Santa Monica Bay and the 
Pacific Ocean.16 
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 
environmental organizations brought suit against the County of Los Angeles 
and the District after the District published monitoring station reports iden-
tifying 140 separate exceedances of the NPDES permit (the “Permit”) water 
quality standards in both the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers.17 The 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants because the plaintiff’s only evidence of 
a CWA violation was data from a monitoring station located downstream of 
defendants’ discharge point.18 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.19 The United States Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit.20 
On remand, the Ninth Circuit ordered the parties to file supplemental 
briefs addressing the implications of the Supreme Court’s ruling.21 After 
considering the supplemental briefs, the Supreme Court’s ruling, and other 
matters, the Ninth Circuit held the defendants liable for permit violations as 
a matter of law.22 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Permit clearly stated 
that the monitoring station data would be used to determine whether the 
NPDES permittee (“Permittee”) had exceeded the amount of allowable pol-
lutants and was in compliance with the Permit, and the reports from the de-
fendant’s monitoring station showed discharges in excess of the permitted 
amount.23 The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s grant of 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
 15 Id. at 1197–98. 
 16 Id. at 1198. 
 17 Id. at 1200–01. An exceedance means that the permittee has exceeded the limits specified 
by either the Clean Water Act or NPDES permit. Sandra J. Beneway, Analysis of the Air Force’s 
Clean Water Act Notice of Violation as a Managerial Tool in Achieving Compliance 31 (Aug. 
1994) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/
tr/fulltext/u2/a284701.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6XR-7CX2]. 
 18 L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d at 1196. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22  Id. at 1196–97. 
 23 Id. at 1197, 1206–07, 1210. 
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summary judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded to the district 
court to determine the appropriate remedy for the defendants’ violations.24 
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision was required 
both by statutory interpretation and case precedent because the Permit ex-
plicitly stated that the monitoring data would be used to determine Permit 
compliance.25 Further, it argues that a preliminary testing period for moni-
toring stations—as well as more frequent monitoring and reporting—will 
clarify liability by establishing a baseline for a permittee to monitor pollu-
tant fluctuations and efficiently address anomalies.26 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) seeks to protect 
“our water from pollution by defending the Clean Water Act.”27 The Los 
Angeles Waterkeeper (“Waterkeeper”) has a similar mission: protecting the 
“waters through enforcement, fieldwork, and community action.”28 Unlike 
the broad reach of NRDC, the Waterkeeper specifically focuses on Santa 
Monica Bay, San Pedro Bay, and adjacent waters.29 The District includes 
eighty-four cities and some unincorporated areas.30 Each of the cities’ 
MS4’s connects to the District’s larger LA MS4.31 The untreated storm wa-
ter discharged from the LA MS4 is deposited via a point source into the Los 
Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers, which then flows into the Santa Monica 
Bay and the Pacific Ocean.32 
In 1990, the first NPDES permit regulating storm water discharges 
from the entities in the District was issued.33 The permit was amended and 
reissued many times since; the 2001 version of the NPDES permit (“the 
Permit”) was at issue in this litigation.34 The NPDES permittees placed the 
mass-emissions monitoring stations in the Los Angeles and San Gabriel 
Rivers (collectively, the “monitoring stations”), downstream from other LA 
MS4 outfalls operated by the defendants and other non-party permittees.35 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Id. at 1197. 
 25 See id. at 1207; infra notes 79–125 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 79–125 and accompanying text. 
 27 Water, supra note 4. 
 28 About Us, L.A. WATERKEEPER, https://lawaterkeeper.org/about-us/ [http://perma.cc/86SL-
GDL8]. 
 29 Id. 
 30 L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d at 1197. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 1198. 
 33 Id. at 1199. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 1200. “Mass-emissions” monitoring stations evaluate the water quality in the receiv-
ing water rather than directly evaluating the nature of the storm water runoff that is discharged 
directly from the LA MS4. Memorandum from Samuel Unger, Exec. Officer, L.A. Reg’l Water 
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The plaintiffs sent a series of notice letters to the defendants regarding 
violations of the Permit terms and subsequent liability under Section 505 of 
the CWA after the District published the annual monitoring results contain-
ing “140 separate exceedances of the Permit’s water quality standards, in-
cluding excessive levels of aluminum, copper, cyanide, zinc, and fecal coli-
form bacteria in both the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers.”36 Section 
505 of the CWA allows private plaintiffs to bring an action enforcing certain 
provisions of the Act.37 On September 18, 2008, plaintiffs filed their First 
Amended Complaint and asserted six causes of action under the CWA.38 
The district court designated four of the Plaintiffs’ claims as the “Wa-
tershed Claims.”39 The district court recognized that the District is respon-
sible for the pollutants when they pass through the monitoring stations, but 
plaintiffs needed to prove that the defendants violated the Permit limitations 
by showing exceedances taken from the defendants’ outfalls.40 After sup-
plemental briefing, the district court again found that plaintiffs did not 
prove that the defendants had discharged pollutants in excess of the allowa-
ble amount from one of their outlets.41 The district court entered summary 
judgment on the “Watershed Claims,” and on June 9, 2010, entered partial 
final judgment on the “Watershed Claims” in favor of the defendants.42 
The plaintiffs appealed, advancing the same argument as they did in 
the district court, that the defendants’ monitoring reports established liabil-
ity as a matter of law.43 The Ninth Circuit rejected that claim because plain-
tiffs failed to prove the individual violations by the defendants.44 The Ninth 
Circuit held the District liable because the District owned and operated the 
mass-emissions monitoring stations, and the pollutants were located in the 
point source when detected.45 
The District’s petition for writ of certiorari was granted in part on June 
25, 2012.46 The Supreme Court held that under the CWA, a discharge of 
pollutants does not occur “when polluted water flows from one portion of a 
                                                                                                                           
Quality Control Bd. to Bd. Members of L.A. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd. 14 (Jan. 20, 2012), 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/losangeles/water_issues/programs/stormwater/municipal/la_ms4/
MS4%20Memo%20012012.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC4B-TR5M]. 
 36 L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d at 1200–01. 
 37 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). 
 38 L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d at 1201. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., No. 08-1467AHM, 2010 WL 
761287, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010). 
 41 L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d at 1202. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 1201. 
 45 Id. at 1202. 
 46 Id. 
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river that is navigable water of the United States, through a concrete chan-
nel or other engineered improvement in the river, and then into a lower por-
tion of the same river[.]”47 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
prior judgment and remanded to the appellate court to address the potential 
liability for the District’s Permit violations.48 
On remand, the Ninth Circuit addressed the requirements for liability 
under the NPDES Permit.49 It held that the defendants were liable under the 
terms of the Permit because the monitoring reports “conclusively demon-
strate[d] that pollution levels in the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers 
[were] in excess of those allowed under the Permit . . . .”50 It then remanded 
the case to the district court to determine the appropriate remedy for the 
violations.51 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In 1948, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(“FWPCA”) to address water pollution at a national level.52 In 1972, after 
much public concern about water pollution, the FWPCA was amended and 
renamed the Clean Water Act (CWA), with the purpose to “restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.”53 The amendments set water quality standards and permitting re-
quirements for pollutant discharge into navigable waters and authorized the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) “to implement pollution con-
trol programs . . . .”54 Section 301(a) of the CWA makes it unlawful to dis-
charge pollutants unless the discharge is in compliance with an applicable 
section of the CWA.55 One section of the CWA that can be applied to make 
a discharge lawful is Section 402, which creates the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit program.56 A NPDES per-
mittee remains in compliance with the CWA by complying with the terms of 
their NPDES permit.57 
                                                                                                                           
 47 L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d at 1202–03. 
 48 Id. at 1203, 1205. 
 49 Id. at 1205. 
 50 Id. at 1210. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified 
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1357 (2012)). 
 53 Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1357); see History of the Clean Water Act, 
supra note 9. 
 54 History of the Clean Water Act, supra note 9; see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1357. 
 55 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). 
 56 Id. §§ 1311(a), 1342. 
 57 See id. § 1342(k). 
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The NPDES program addresses water pollution by establishing en-
forceable effluent limitations for point sources that discharge pollutants to 
waters of the United States.58 The EPA Administrator prescribes the stand-
ards for compliance, “including conditions on data and information collec-
tion, reporting, and such other requirements as he deems appropriate.”59 
The CWA requires NPDES permittees to monitor their discharges to 
demonstrate compliance with the permit limits.60 Congress implemented the 
self-monitoring component of the permit to make it easier to enforce the 
Act.61 
In 1987, Congress amended the CWA and authorized EPA to regulate 
storm water point sources by creating a separate permitting program for city 
storm sewer systems (“MS4”).62 MS4 permittees establish monitoring to 
produce data representative of the their discharge.63 EPA requires permittees 
to submit a “monitoring program for representative data collection for the 
term of the permit that describes the location of outfalls or field screening 
point to be sampled” and explains “why the [chosen] location is representa-
tive  . . . .”64 It is unlawful for permittees to not monitor their pollutant dis-
charges.65 It is also a violation of the CWA for a permittee to discharge pol-
lutants in excess of the levels specified in the permit.66 Citizens may en-
force permit conditions under Section 505 of the CWA, known as the citi-
zen suit provision.67 The EPA Administrator may also authorize a state to 
administer the NPDES permit program for discharges within the jurisdiction 
of such state.68 
Pursuant to the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act, California 
has delegated water pollution enforcement and NPDES permitting to the 
State Water Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”) and nine regional 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See id. § 1342; National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/npdes [https://perma.cc/U2HR-KUBW]. 
 59 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2). 
 60 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(i)(1) (2015) (stating that each NPDES permit shall include conditions 
meeting monitoring requirements to assure compliance with the permit limitations). 
 61 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; Revision of Regulations, 44 Fed. 
Reg. 32,854, 32,863 (June 7, 1979) (“Congress intended that prosecution for permit violations be 
swift and simple . . . .”). 
 62 L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d at 1209. 
 63 40 C.F.R. § 122.48(b). 
 64 Id. § 122.26(d)(2)(iii)(D). 
 65 Id. § 122.26(d)(2)(i)(F)) (“Permit applications for discharges from large and medium mu-
nicipal storm sewers . . . shall include . . . monitoring procedures necessary to determine compli-
ance and noncompliance with permit conditions . . . .”). 
 66 See id. § 122.41(a) (“Any permit noncompliance constitutes a violation of the Clean Water 
Act and is grounds for [an] enforcement action . . . .”). 
 67 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). 
 68 Id. §§ 1342(a)(5), (b). 
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boards.69 The SWRCB for the Los Angeles Region (the “Regional Board”) 
issues the NPDES permits in Los Angeles.70 The NPDES permit contains 
monitoring and reporting requirements, general requirements of the CWA 
and specific provisions related to storm-sewer infrastructure and dis-
charge.71 The relevant section of the Permit at issue in this litigation is Part 
2, titled “Receiving Water Limitations,” which includes the Monitoring and 
Reporting Program procedure.”72 
Pursuant to Part 2, the limitations prohibit discharges that violate, or 
contribute to violating, the Water Quality Standards (“WQSs”) or Water 
Quality Objectives (“WQOs”).73 WQSs and WQOs are determined by crite-
ria established in the Basin Plan, California Ocean Plan, National Toxics 
Rule, California Toxics Rule, and other state or federally approved surface 
water quality plans.74 To effectuate Part 2, the state’s Monitoring and Re-
porting Program requires these permittees (the “Permittees”) to report their 
pollution monitoring at least annually.75 The purpose of the mass-emissions 
monitoring is to “assess compliance . . . [m]easure and improve the effec-
tiveness of the Stormwater Quality Management Plans . . . [and] [a]ssess the 
overall health and evaluate long-term trends in receiving water quality.”76 
The Permit requires that the Principal Permittee designate monitoring sta-
                                                                                                                           
 69 Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act, CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1300–16104 (West 
2015). 
 70 NPDES Municipal Permit, L.A. Stormwater, L.A.’s Watershed Protection Program, http://
www.lastormwater.org/about-us/npdes-municipal-permit/ [https://perma.cc/AT8E-WTT7]. 
 71 See NPDES Frequent Questions, U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/
npdes-frequent-questions#pane-1 [https://perma.cc/PRQ2-A48J]. 
 72 See CAL. REG’L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD., NPDES PERMIT-RECEIVING WATER LIMI-
TATIONS 17 (2001), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/losangeles/water_issues/programs/stormwater/
municipal/los_angeles_ms4/reopener/2%20-%20la%20ms4%20permit%20w%20proposed%20
language%20changes%20except%20finding%20may%2018%20200_.pdf [https://perma.cc/CH7M-
7QN8]. Individual permits contain both general and specific requirements; the discussion of the 
“Permit” in this Part refers to the general CWA requirements incorporated into the NPDES per-
mits issued by the SWRCB. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See generally JOHN B. MARSHACK, STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, CAL. 
ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, A COMPILATION OF WATER QUALITY GOALS (2016), http://www.water
boards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/water_quality_goals/docs/wq_goals_text.pdf [https://perma.
cc/RCB5-APLE] (describing the promulgation and enforcement of California’s water quality 
standards). 
 75 U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR THE PREPARATION OF PART 2 OF THE 
NPDES PERMIT APPLICATIONS FOR DISCHARGES FROM MUNICIPAL SEPARATE STORM SEWER 
SYSTEMS 5–20 (1992), https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0246.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYR8-
8K3S]. 
 76 L.A. CTY. DEP’T OF PUB. WORKS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at es-1 (n.d.), http://dpw.
lacounty.gov/wmd/npdes/2003-04_report/ExecutiveSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/HBD5-2HKW]. 
48 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 43:E. Supp. 
tions throughout the County to conduct mass-emissions monitoring for the 
LA MS477 The permittees are responsible for their own discharge.78 
The courts treat the NPDES permit as a contract—in consideration of 
NPDES permit compliance, a permittee may receive a waiver to the general 
prohibition of discharging pollutants into waters of the United States.79 The 
court will apply the same interpretation principles to the permit’s terms and 
enforcement as they would to any other contract.80 If the permit’s language 
in context “is plain and capable of legal construction, the language alone 
must determine the permit’s meaning.”81 If the language of the permit is 
ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be supplemented to aid interpretation.82 
A permit is ambiguous if reasonable people could interpret the terms to 
have more than one meaning.83 “‘[A] court must give effect to every word 
or term’ in an NPDES permit ‘and reject none as meaningless or surplusage 
. . . .’”84 There is an obligation to interpret the permit in light of the permit-
ting authority’s intention.85 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that National Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit (“Permit”) violations 
resulted in liability as a matter of law because the Permit clearly stated that 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Letter from Samuel Unger, Exec. Officer, L.A. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., to Bd. 
Members, L.A. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., on Key Issues Raised by Stakeholders Regard-
ing the Reissuance of the Los Angeles Count MS4 Permit 7 (2012), http://www.waterboards.ca.
gov/losangeles/water_issues/programs/stormwater/municipal/la_ms4/MS4%20Memo%20012012.
pdf [https://perma.cc/W7T2-BXT6] (“The permit establishes that the Principal Permittee shall 
monitor the mass emissions stations.”). 
 78 See Letter from Gail Farber, Director of Pub. Works, and Gary Hildebrand, Assistant Depu-
ty Director, Watershed Mgmt. Division L.A. Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Works, to State Water Resources 
Control Bd. (July 28, 2011), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/tmdl/docs/santa
clarariver_bacteria/comments/gary_hildebrand.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VZL-VSD5]. 
 79 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1342 (2012). 
 80 See Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 81 See Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268 F.3d 255, 270 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
 82 See id. 
 83 See Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
 84 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995) (describing 
how it is a “cardinal principle of contract construction” that “a document should be read to give 
effect to all of its provisions and to render them consistent with each other”); In re Crystal Props., 
Ltd., L.P., 268 F.3d 743, 748 (9th Cir. 2001); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 203(a) (1981) (“[A]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to 
all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no 
effect.”). 
 85 Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 270. 
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the monitoring station data would be used to determine whether the NPDES 
permittee had exceeded the amount of allowable pollutant discharge, and 
was in compliance with the Permit.86 
In deciding County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit rejected the de-
fendants’ position that the mass-emissions monitoring station was not de-
signed to measure permittee compliance.87 By treating the NPDES permit 
as a contract, the court determined that the Permit language explicitly stat-
ed: “Assessing compliance with this [Permit]” is one of the “primary objec-
tives of the Monitoring Program.”88 Because of the explicit language in the 
Permit, the court determined that there was not more than one reasonable 
interpretation, and therefore the Permit language was unambiguous.89 
The defendants contended that the mass-emissions monitoring data 
was not intended to establish liability for permit violations without inde-
pendent monitoring of a permittee’s city storm sewer system (“MS4”) be-
cause the Permit language stated: “‘Each permittee is responsible only for a 
discharge for which it is the operator.’”90 The Ninth Circuit rejected this 
argument because this interpretation would lead to the unreasonable result 
of allowing unlimited discharge from the District’s larger MS4 (“LA MS4”) 
without liability for the monitoring results, when the purpose of the moni-
toring is to assess permittee compliance with discharge limitations.91 To 
give effect to all of the terms in the Permit in a consistent fashion, the court 
interpreted the Permit language at issue to address remedy instead of liabil-
ity for the Permit violations.92 The court therefore reasoned that since the 
monitoring data showed pollutants in excess of permissible limits defined in 
the terms of the Permit, the defendants were not in compliance and were 
liable for violating the Permit limitations.93 
Although the court determined that the language of the Permit explicit-
ly established that the monitoring data would be used to determine Permit 
compliance, it proceeded to address the “extrinsic considerations” establish-
ing liability for pollutant discharge exceedances under the Permit.94 The 
court rejected the defendants’ contention that the monitoring program did 
                                                                                                                           
 86 725 F.3d 1194, 1206, 2010 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 87 Id. at 1205. 
 88 See id. at 1204–05 (“NPDES permits are treated like any other contract.”). Although there 
is a general prohibition against discharging into waters of the United States, the NPDES permit 
under the CWA acts as a waiver to the general prohibition, allowing the permittee to discharge in 
consideration of complying with the Permit requirements such as effluent limitations and monitor-
ing. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342 (2012). 
 89 L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d at 1205. 
 90 Id. at 1204, 1206. 
 91 Id. at 1206. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 1206–07. 
 94 Id. at 1207. 
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not measure, nor was it implemented to measure, individual permittee com-
pliance, as this result would render the Permit unlawful under the Clean 
Water Act (CWA).95 
The County of Los Angeles court cited to an amicus brief filed by the 
permitting authority in a similar case that explicitly stated its position on 
this issue.96 In the brief, the permitting authority rejected the defendants’ 
position, recognizing that enforcement of the Permit in an integrated storm 
sewer system could not be avoided because the source of pollutants could 
not be definitively ascertained.97 The permitting authority further noted that 
because the monitoring program did not produce individualized permittee 
data, individualized permittee data was not required to establish liability.98 
Finally, the court noted that to effectuate the purpose of the CWA, the 
NPDES program for MS4s relies on self-monitoring.99 The court reasoned 
that Congress implemented self-monitoring to “promote straightforward 
enforcement of the Act,” allowing enforcement based on “little, if anything, 
more than the . . . reports submitted by the permittee itself.”100 As required 
by law, the defendants chose the locations of the monitoring stations that 
“were necessarily ‘representative’ of the monitored activity . . . .”101 The 
data collected at defendants’ monitoring stations was therefore representa-
tive of their pollutant discharges under the Permit.102 
The County of Los Angeles case was remanded to determine the ap-
propriate remedy for the defendants’ violations because the Ninth Circuit 
determined that pollution levels in excess of those allowed under the Permit 
constituted liability as a matter of law.103 The defendants’ contention that 
there was no proof that any individual defendant discharged pollutants in 
excess of the permitted amount was unsuccessful because the Permit lan-
guage and the current monitoring program established liability for reports 
showing pollutants in excess of the allowable amount.104 
Under contract law, the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the defendants are 
liable for Permit violations was legally sound.105 Furthermore, the court’s 
decision was consistent with the purpose and language of the CWA.106 Alt-
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 1207–08. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 1208. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 1209. 
 102 Id. at 1209–10. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See id. at 1206–07. 
 105 See id. at 1204–05. 
 106 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1357 (2012) (stating the purpose of the CWA as to “restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”); L.A. Cty. Flood 
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hough the decision was sensible in light of contract law and the CWA, it 
might lead to new regulations requiring a preliminary testing period for the 
monitoring station as part of the permit process, as well as more frequent 
monitoring and reporting.107 These new regulations would clarify liability 
by informing permittees of the area they are liable for, raising awareness as 
to the pollutant composition early on, and effectuating speedy enforcement 
and compliance with the NPDES program.108 
Because the NPDES permit is treated as a contract, the court’s role is 
to enforce the contract based on the terms in the permit.109 Because the 
plain language of the Permit explicitly stated that the Monitoring Program 
was intended to assess compliance with the Permit, there was no need for 
the court to look to extrinsic evidence to interpret its terms.110 Nonetheless, 
because of the defendants’ issue with a seemingly contradictory term in the 
Permit, the court looked to extrinsic evidence—such as the purpose of the 
CWA and the permitting authority’s interpretation—and determined that 
under the Permit, the defendants were liable for exceeding the Permit limi-
tations.111 Thus, regardless of whether or not the plain language of the Per-
mit stated that the monitoring program was intended to determine compli-
ance, the extrinsic evidence also supported the court’s determination that 
the defendants were liable.112 
Because permittees choose the monitoring station locations as repre-
sentative of their outfalls, it is sensible that individual contribution amounts 
need not be determined.113 As evidenced by County of Los Angeles, it is 
difficult to measure the distinct sewer system effluent from a point source 
due to the comingling of pollutants once they are dispersed into water.114 
Nevertheless, an exceedance of effluent limitations from a point source is a 
violation of the Permit and CWA, regardless of the pollution origin.115 
The NPDES application process should require the prospective permit-
tee to run preliminary testing before choosing where to locate the monitor-
ing station, as well as collect information on upstream discharges to the 
                                                                                                                           
Control Dist., 725 F.3d at 1200, 1204 (describing how the purpose of the mass-emissions monitor-
ing is to estimate emissions and assess trends and exceedances). 
 107 See infra notes 79–125 and accompanying text. The Administrator determines the neces-
sary requirements to carry out the provisions of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a)(1)(B), (2). 
 108 See infra notes 116–120 and accompanying text. 
 109 L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d at 1204. 
 110 Id. at 1204–05. 
 111 Id. at 1205, 1207–10. 
 112 See id. at 1207–10. 
 113 See id. at 1209. 
 114 See id. at 1208. 
 115 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012). 
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MS4.116 If the results from the preliminary testing show pollutants different 
in either type or volume than expected, the prospective permittee should 
have the option to research the source of pollutants or relocate the monitor-
ing station (if it is determined that the pollutants are derived from a source 
other than the prospective permittee).117 Although preliminary testing will 
not ensure consistent monitoring results throughout the duration of the per-
mit, the permittee will be aware of the baseline specifying the type and 
quantity of pollutants in the MS4 at the time of initial permitting.118 More 
consistent reporting and monitoring will alert the permittee and regulatory 
authority early on if there is a flux in the type or quantity of pollutants; this 
will result in faster resolution of the anomaly and less possibility of contin-
uous unchartered pollution without liability.119 For example, if from one 
month to the next there is an influx of a certain pollutant, the permittee can 
use one of EPA’s public search tools to ascertain whether new nearby facili-
ties were granted a NPDES permit, whether there has been new develop-
ment, or whether there is a facility nearby that uses the specific pollutant.120 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.48(b) (2015) (requiring that the monitoring be “sufficient to yield data 
which are representative of the monitored activity”). As the reported data will be representative of 
the permittee’s effluent, there should be a preliminary testing period informing the permittee of 
the current pollutant composition to allow an informed decision on where to locate the monitoring 
station and to ensure that the reporting is representative of the permittee’s effluent. See id. For 
instance, a month long preliminary test producing data similar to that of the monitoring station 
will inform the prospective permittee of the pollutant composition and set a baseline for future 
monitoring. See id. Since the NPDES permit is issued in draft form for public comment before it is 
approved, information regarding the upstream discharges would be useful for the public to deter-
mine if the proposed location is unreasonable. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a). 
 117 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.48(b). Because monitoring is intended to produce data is that is repre-
sentative of the monitored activity, the permittee should relocate the monitoring station if the 
results of the preliminary testing are not representative of the monitored activity to effectuate the 
purpose of the monitoring under the NPDES permit. See id. 
 118 See id. 
 119 See CAL. REG’L WATER QUALITY CONTROL BD., MONITORING AND REPORTING PROGRAM 
FOR NPDES PERMIT NO. CAS004001: WASTE DISCHARGE REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNICIPAL SEPA-
RATE STORM SEWER SYSTEM (MS4) DISCHARGES WITHIN THE COASTAL WATERSHEDS OF LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY, EXCEPT THOSE DISCHARGES ORIGINATING FROM THE CITY OF LONG BEACH 
MS4E-55 to -66 (2012), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/losangeles/water_issues/programs/storm
water/municipal/la_ms4/Revised/2nd%20REVISED%20TENTATIVE%20-%20Attachment%20
E_11-5-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/N79F-79XN]. Requirements show different reporting requirements 
for different pollutants and water bodies. Id. For instance, estuary bacteria was scheduled to be 
reported daily, but toxic pollutant monitoring for a harbor scheduled is monitored annually. Id. It 
can be inferred that the more frequent the water body is monitored, the less pollutants it will have 
since an exceedance of the allowable limit will require action to get it within the allowable limit. 
See id. 
 120 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES): EPA Tools Related to 
NPDES, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/epa-tools-related-npdes [https://perma.
cc/9TKF-N4Y2]. Federal and state “right-to-know” laws permit workers to access information 
regarding chemicals in their workplaces. See Right-to-Know Laws and Rights, AFSCME, http://
www.afscme.org/news/publications/workplace-health-and-safety/safe-jobs-now-a-guide-to-health-
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As County of Los Angeles illustrates, the more time that passes be-
tween reporting, the more difficult it is to determine the sources of the 
comingled pollution.121 More frequent monitoring and reporting will inform 
the permittee of exceedances earlier, and if the permittee does not address 
the exceedance, it will constitute the permittee’s acquiescence of unlawful 
pollution.122 
The State Regional Boards in California learned “that programs having 
more specific permit requirements were generally more comprehensive and 
effective in controlling storm water pollution.”123 “The specificity of the 
provisions enabled the permitting authorities to enforce MS4 permits and 
improve the water quality of storm water discharges.”124 The permitting 
authorities should promulgate explicit regulations requiring preliminary 
testing before final issuance of the permit, as well as monitoring and report-
ing on a monthly basis.125 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles determined that if 
a monitoring station reports pollution amounts exceeding those allowed un-
                                                                                                                           
and-safety-in-the-workplace/chapter-5-controlling-chemical-hazards/right-to-know-laws-and-rights 
[https://perma.cc/V62F-WZMW]. 
The federal law that provides these rights is OSHA Hazard Communication Stand-
ard (29 C.F.R. 1910.1200). Private-sector employees must provide chemical infor-
mation to their workers under the OSHA standard. Most states have their own 
Right-to-Know laws that cover public-sector workers. In some of these states, work-
ers have stronger rights than under the federal Hazard Communication Standard. 
Id. 
 121 See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. L.A. Cty. Flood Control Dist., 725 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 
2013) (plaintiffs could not prove the individual contributions to the Permit violations). 
 122 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 839–40 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2010). In United States v. Metalite Corp., the court 
rejected the defendant’s argument that the relevant sections of the CWA outlined a specific intent 
of crime. No. 99-008-CR-B/N, 2000 US. Dist. LEXIS 11507, at *11 (S.D. Ind. 2000). Although 
the enforcement provision of the CWA does not require intent of crime, one can still be liable for 
a violation regardless of whether the permittee realizes they are committing a crime. See PLATER, 
supra, at 840. Therefore, because a violation of exceeding permit violations does not require in-
tent, the fact that a permittee would have knowledge of the violation makes for an even stronger 
case against a permittee if there is an exceedance after the permittee is notified in the report. See 
id. 
 123 STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BD., CALIFORNIA ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PHASE II 
SMALL MUNICIPAL SEPARATE STORM SEWER SYSTEM (SMALL MS4) GENERAL PERMIT 2 (2013), 
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/publications_forms/publications/factsheets/docs/ms4factsheet_010413.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/4J37-LQVH]. 
 124 Id. 
 125 See id. (Since more specific permit requirements are more effective, the state should be 
explicit with the requirements.). 
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der a Clean Water Act (CWA) permit, the permittee is liable as a matter of 
law under the Act. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied contract 
law principles to effectuate the purpose of the CWA. 
Although the permit clearly states that monitoring station data will be 
used to determine permit compliance, requirements that there be prelimi-
nary testing of a proposed monitoring station location, and increased fre-
quency of monitoring and reporting, will clarify liability and further the 
goals of the CWA. These requirements should lead to less enforcement liti-
gation dealing with the source of pollutants because the permittee will be 
able to compare the monthly reports to the established baseline, rendering 
the permittee unable to deny liability if no action is taken to amend the ex-
ceedance. More frequent self-reporting will improve compliance with the 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System program, leading to over-
all better water quality, as there will be less accumulation of pollutants be-
fore they are discovered. 
